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Abstract—The proliferation of cloud-enabled services has
caused an exponential growth in the traffic volume of modern
data centres (DCs). An important aspect for the optimal operation
of DCs related to the real-time detection of anomalies within the
measured traffic volume in order to identify possible threats or
challenges that are caused by either malicious or legitimate intent.
Therefore in this paper we present SDN-PANDA; a ’pluggable’
software platform that aims to provide centralised administra-
tion and experimentation for anomaly detection techniques in
Software Defined Data Centres (SDDCs). We present the overall
design of the proposed scheme, and illustrate some initial results
related to the performance of the current prototype with respect
to scalability and basic traffic visualisation. We argue that the
introduced platform may facilitate the underlying functional basis
for a number of real-time anomaly detection applications and
provide the necessary foundations for such algorithms to be easily
deployed.
Keywords—Software Defined Networking, Software Defined
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I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in Internet technologies have caused an
exponential growth in the number of reported network attacks
we face on a constant basis. Hence, anomaly-based network
intrusion detection has evolved and constitutes a basic asset on
addressing this issue. A number of existing approaches rely on
either centralized or distributed measurement and monitoring
sensors within a given backbone network in order to capture
and further profile the traffic-wise behaviour within a given
Anomaly Detection (AD) methodology [1].
Profiling incorporates a technique whereby a given sys-
tem’s operational behaviour is monitored over a period of time
in order to define an accepted ’normal’ operational profile. This
profile is then used as a benchmark for defining reasonable
measures of deviation for detecting anomalous events in net-
work traffic. Recent research in Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) [2], and its application towards Internet and data
centre (DC) security has demonstrated exciting opportunities
for exploring, and creating effective AD methods that can
adequately confront the highly dynamic and cost-demanding
network management requirements as derived by real-time
security challenges [2].
In this paper we present our work to date in implementing
SDN-PANDA, an SDN-enabled platform that will act as the
underlying basis for configurable AD where related algorithms
may be easily ”plugged” and deployed. We describe the design
and features our platform intends to provide, and present
initial benchmarking results that mainly focus on the real-
time operational overhead as well as on the traffic visualization
enabled by SDN-PANDA. Similarly with the studies in [2] and
[3] this paper describes an architectural SDN-enabled platform
design whereby centralised monitoring is performed against
aggregated flow statistics that make up the global network
view. However, unlike [4] where the focus is directed towards
small home and office networks, we focus our platforms
application towards large scale virtualized and multi-tenant
DC environments. Further, the SDN-PANDA platform differs
from [3], as we place an emphasis on the advantages pro-
vided by coupling SDNs and Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) [5] and their role on remediating anomalous events in
our proposed platform.
Overall, we propose that by taking advantage of SDNs
centralized control plane, and its global view of a given
network, we are able to mitigate the challenges and limi-
tations associated with current distributed monitoring mod-
els and techniques. Our proposed solution takes advantage
of statistical data that is obtainable from OpenFlow-enabled
switches [6], in the form of network flow table statistical
traffic aggregate records. Our method implements Switch →
Controller aggregate flow monitoring, and presents an interface
whereby researchers of the AD network intrusion field are able
to configure algorithm-specific preprocessing techniques for
traffic feature selection. To prevent adaptability and scalability
limitation we have intentionally avoided any dependence on
controller libraries. We have developed our modules in python,
and conduct experimentation with Floodlight [7] and POX [8]
controllers. Hence, the herein presented research aims to
contribute by providing a generic and module-independent
experimental platform that can be adapted throughout the
network security research community to experiment with, and
further develop AD based security techniques for SDDCs and
SDN-enabled networks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
section II is dedicated at presenting the architectural design
of the SDN-PANDA platform whereas section III presents
some initial benchmarking results of the proposed platform
that relate to traffic visualisation and real-time performance
cost. Finally, section IV provides the future directions of this
work and concludes this paper.
II. SDN-PANDA DESIGN
SDN-PANDA consists of three controller-centric applica-
tion modules -
1) Network Monitoring Module - (NMM)
2) Network Intrusion Detection Module - NID
3) Network Intrusion Response Module - (NIRM)
Figure 1 depicts a high level diagram of the proposed
SDN-PANDA platform, and its placement within a generic
data centre topology. Each module residing within the SDN-
PANDA architecture allows for centralized administration via
the controller management plane. Similar to [3], we design
each of the modules as separate entities so that adaptable
implementation of existing AD methods is possible whilst re-
taining configurable synergy to support each other. By aiming
to provide this degree of flexibility, network operators are free
to plug and further configure AD applications, network flow
sampling requirements and rate intervals without deploying
distributed monitoring agents.
A. Network Monitoring Module (NMM)
The NMM is responsible for data collection and pre-
processing of switch aggregated flow statistics (e.g. packet
match fields, packet counters, src/dst IP address, src/dst Ports,
instructions and timeouts). The monitoring approach within
the NMM differs to that in [3], as it does not rely on
packet sampling techniques in order to construct statistical flow
aggregates. Instead the NMM monitoring approach utilises the
controller’s REST API used for pushing switch commands,
and also for delivering flow-table counter statistics to the
controller.Thus we are able to obtain complete flow aggregate
records without inflicting further processing demand on the
controller. We achieve this by utilising the data used for
monitoring the network state and provide network operators
a centralised global view of the network.
B. Network Anomaly Detection Module (NID)
The NID is a pluggable interface for rapid deployment
and configuration by network operators. Hence, it is intended
to accommodate a broad variety of flow-level AD techniques
available. By providing a high degree of customisation, oper-
ators will be able to deploy new state-of-the-art tools faster,
and break away from the vendor lock in paradigm associated
with traditional middle boxes as discussed in [5]. We propose
a flexible interface in our NID so that others are free to
further implement alternative intrusion detection methods such
as packed based signature detection engines. By doing so,
we intend to provide a foundational grounding for the rapid
deployment of, and experimentation with both AD and packets
based intrusion detection techniques in unity.
In order to address the potential for service degradation
or controller resource exhaustion we align with the work
in [9] whereby a flexible packet based sampling extension
for OpenFlow is presented. We argue that this could prove
beneficial when considering methods for obtaining packets for
signature based analysis.
C. Network Intrusion Response Module (NIRM)
We design NIRM to function independently to NID so
that response actions are defined based on standard policies,
which are non-dependent on the AD method used. Anomalous
instances detected by NID raise an alert message which is fed
into the NIRM. Thus, the NIRM is responsible for autonomous
execution of appropriate remediation policies in the event of a
TRUE-POSITIVE intrusion alert.
Remediation policies must be accurately defined so that
they only mitigate the identified attack or malicious intent in
the DC. Ensuring any remediation action does not cause loss
of service, or disruption to other users of the infrastructure.
This makes applying the standard practice of dropping network
packets, or isolating a physical host inapplicable in multi-
tenant DCs.
By virtue of addressing the aforementioned issue, our
work is inspired by the work in [10], whereby virtual ma-
chine instances are invoked on demand to provide scalable
DC attack resilience. However, instead of invoking virtual
machines (VMs) to saturate processing demand, the NIRM
relies on NFV replication of legitimate tenant services into
a different cluster of the DC infrastructure. Subsequently the
NIRM aims to update all flow routes towards these replicated
instances, leaving only the malicious or compromised tenants
VM instance. By doing so it is therefore feasible to contain
developing incidents and further provide vital input to the op-
erators on investigating the source of the anomalous behaviour.
III. RESULTS
In order to have a generic assessment of the performance
of our proposed platform, we have implement our monitoring
module on both the Floodlight and POX network controllers
and are currently exploring avenues for inclusion of the
OpenDaylight[12], and RYU[13] controllers.
To allow our platform to be utilised by future controllers
we employed a standardised JSON interface and message
response format compromising uniform value keys across all
controllers. Our initial experimentation indicates that both the
POX and FloodLight controller REST Response messages
differ in formatting, as well as what can be utilised as attribute
labels required by different AD applications. Furthermore,
each of the controllers employ system-specific JSON request
interfaces, which could cause configuration errors and limit the
global intelligence available to SDN-PANDA.
When considering the application of our monitoring mod-
ule towards multi-controller domains these variations cause
scalability issues. We propose that by standardising the JSON
aggregated flow record labelling we are able to adopt the
included values as labelled attributes. Through this implemen-
tation, the SDN-PANDA is able to reduce the overall flow
record pre-processing time. In standardising the above we are
able to assume with confidence that flow records used as input
data for training purposes are globally consistent, and globally
accessible in scalable SDDCs.
In order to include traffic variation within our aggre-
gate logs, we replay a network trace file containing 60,000
TCP/UDP flows into a simulated mininet network [14]. We
configure a small SDDC tree topology containing 8 switches,
Fig. 1. SDN-PANDA Design Diagram
and one POX network controller where we deploy our platform
modules. The resultant real-time monitoring aggregate pro-
duces 11, 906 records collected by our NMM throughout the
duration of our experiment. Figure 2 provides the traffic visu-
alisation enabled by SDN-PANDA and depicts the variation in
network service traffic present within our experiment duration.
It is evident, that the greatest amount of bytes was consumed
by the SMB protocol followed by several FTP sessions.
For validation of the performance capabilities of our plat-
form, we perform a benchmarking process by incrementing
system load balancing. During the benchmarking analysis we
execute a ping flood performance test against the SMB service
depict by port 445 within figure 2. We initially conduct our
experimental runs with one switch to test the real-time feasi-
bility capabilities of our platform, and increment the number
of switches as demand increases as presented in figure 3. Our
results suggest that our application is capable of scaling to
meet the demanding requirements of dynamic environments
typically associated with DC networks. Our simulation at-
tempts to replicate a scenario whereby an increasing service
demand is met through the initiation of virtualised service
instances and switches so that system performance remains
unaffected. We demonstrate that utilising aggregated network
flow statistics accessible via the JSON-REST API as input data
for our platforms pluggable AD algorithm module we maintain
scalable properties.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The rapidly changing traffic demands on internet infras-
tructure require new network security tools and support. As
Fig. 2. Traffic volume distribution per protocol.
Fig. 3. Computational time cost vs. number of switches
more and more embrace the heterogeneous benefits of SDDC
service hosting, traffic volume and targeted cyber attacks will
increase in parallel. In this paper we have described SDN-
PANDA – an SDN and NFV architectural platform for reaping
the benefits of AD in a SDDC. The aim behind SDN-PANDA
is to provide an experimental platform capable of being used
as the underlying basis for the real-time deployment and
operation of AD methods in SDDCs. Consequently, the real-
time operation of AD methods via the SDN-PANDA platform
would contribute towards the reactive identification of threats
that could challenge the optimal operation of the SDDC. We
describe that by utilising switch recorded flow statistics as
input data towards our pluggable AD application module,
network operators are able to specify appropriate remediation
actions for detected malicious anomalies.
For future work we plan to compare SDN-PANDA against
similar systems, e.g. - [3], [4],[10] and their suitability towards
large-scale virtualized environments. Furthermore, we intend
on providing an intuitive library of existing AD techniques
for experimentation and implementation that meet scalability
requirements of real world SDDCs.
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